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Pregnancy in Confinement, Anti-Shackling Laws and the 
“Extraordinary Circumstances” Loophole 
CHRIS DINARDO* 
“One might have hoped that, by this hour, the very sight of chains on black flesh, 
or the very sight of chains, would be so intolerable a sight for the American people, 
and so unbearable a memory, that they would themselves spontaneously rise up 
and strike off the manacles. But, no, they appear to glory in their chains; now, more 
than ever, they appear to measure their safety in chains and corpses.” – James 
Baldwin1 
*** 
The draconian practice of shackling pregnant women is a scourge on the 
human rights of incarcerated persons, particularly women of color.2 An approach 
to abolishing the practice that intricately supplements current Eighth Amendment 
methodology with other legal frameworks while improving deficient legislation 
may provide unique and unexplored pathways to remedy. Understanding how 
shackling incarcerated women in labor adversely affects intersectional identities 
of women based on race, class, immigration status, and gender identity or 
expression can anchor the expansion of jurisprudence around prisoners’ rights. 
This Note will explore how these frameworks, from international human 
rights to a critical race lens, can provide an understanding of the issue of shackling 
pregnant prisoners. It will seek to demonstrate how anti-shackling laws, when 
they do exist, actually serve to bolster the practice of shackling by way of a highly 
discretionary “extraordinary circumstances” loophole. Part I will explore the 
current state of shackling in U.S. prisons, jails, and detention centers and how the 
history of female confinement has led us here. Part II explains how current laws 
and policies regarding shackling end up promoting, rather than restraining, prison 
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 1.  James Baldwin, An Open Letter to My Sister, Miss Angela Davis, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 7, 
1971), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1971/01/07/an-open-letter-to-my-sister-miss-angela-davis/. 
 2.  Throughout this Note, references to “women,” “female” prisoners, or “mothers” who have 
experienced shackling during pregnancy will commonly be used. While other individuals with 
uteruses may experience pregnancy within prison (such as transgender men, gender non-conforming 
persons, or intersex persons), documented cases of those incidents are difficult to find. Based on the 
statistical information available, the overwhelming majority of cases of shackling of pregnant 
individuals concern women. Therefore, for sake of clarity, the language throughout, including 
pronouns (she/her/hers) will be gendered. 
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officials engaged in shackling pregnant prisoners through discretionary loopholes. 
Part III looks to the courts to see how judges have shaped Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence on shackling in recent years. Lastly, Part IV attempts to map new 
approaches for advocacy groups dealing with individuals who have been—or are 
facing the prospect of being—shackled during pregnancy, particularly during 
labor, delivery, or post-partum recovery. It outlines an approach that combines 
impact litigation, improved state and federal legislation, and grassroots 
organizing, working interdependently, to bring about the eradication of the 
insidious practice of shackling pregnant women. 
I. HOW SHACKLING OPERATES IN U.S. PRISONS, JAILS, AND DETENTION CENTERS 
In April 2013, just two months into a one-year sentence at the Milwaukee 
County Jail, Melissa Hall went into labor with her third child.3 When she was 
transferred from the jail to the hospital to give birth, her ankles were shackled and 
her wrists handcuffed.4 Her handcuffs were then connected to a chain wrapped 
around her belly during transport.5 In the hospital’s delivery room, armed guards 
shackled her right wrist and her left ankle to her hospital bed, the manacles 
digging into her flesh, despite doctors’ repeated pleas to remove them.6 The chains 
made the epidural difficult to administer to Hall, leaving only part of her body 
numb.7 They also prevented her from moving naturally during delivery, leaving 
her susceptible to a greater risk of complications.8 
She finally delivered her healthy son, Jesus.9 But as she held him, “she had to 
put a pillow between his tiny body and the crook of her arm so he wouldn’t get 
hit by her chains.”10 In March of 2017, Hall filed a lawsuit against Milwaukee 
County on behalf of herself and a class of plaintiffs, alleging a violation of her 
constitutional rights.11 
A. How Did We Get Here? 
In recent decades, there has been a staggering growth in the population of 
women incarcerated in U.S. prisons, jails, and detention facilities. Since 1980, the 
female population locked up has ballooned by more than 700%.12 Currently,                       
 
 3.  Rebecca Nelson, She Knew She’d Deliver Her Son While She Was in Jail. She Didn’t Expect to Do It 
in Chains, COSMOPOLITAN (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/a13034685/preg 
nancy-prison-childbirth-chains/.  
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Nelson, supra note 3. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Hall v. County of Milwaukee, No. 2:17-cv-00379 (E.D. Wis. filed Mar. 14, 2017). 
 12.  THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS (2015). 
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almost one-third of female prisoners around the world are incarcerated in the 
United States.13 
Among all people incarcerated, Black women represent the fastest-growing 
demographic group, broken down by race and gender, within the past few 
decades.14 In fact, Black women in the United States are incarcerated at a higher 
rate than the total populations of South Africa, Spain, and England combined.15 In 
recent years, however, the racial disparity between white, Black, and Hispanic 
women in prison has actually become less lopsided with an increase in white 
women being incarcerated.16 Though the imprisonment rate for Black women (96 
per 100,000) is still roughly double what it is for white women (49 per 100,000), 
due to the larger population size of white women, they currently outpace the total 
number of Black women in prison by roughly 2.5 to 1.17 Additionally, over 60% of 
women in prison are ages 18-39, the age group for whom pregnancy most often 
occurs.18 
It is no coincidence that this dramatic uptick in incarcerated women, 
especially Black women, began during the 1970s and 1980s, a period when 
enforcement of zero-tolerance anti-drug policies became more pronounced. The 
federal government’s “War on Drugs” dominated law enforcement and carceral 
policies beginning in the 1960s, though enforcement was heavily increased from 
the Nixon administration through the Clinton administration.19 These policies are 
primarily responsible for the increase in female prisoners, mainly women of 
color.20 The federal Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988 substantially increased 
not only the number of women incarcerated, but also the duration of their 
sentences.21 Harsh state anti-drug laws disproportionately impacted women as 
well.22 While the War on Drugs had a harmful effect on both men and women, 
drug policies that commenced during the Reagan administration demonstrate the 
disparate effect on women. The number of women incarcerated in state facilities 
for drug-related offenses increased by 888% between 1986 and 1999, far surpassing 
 
 13.  ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CENTRE FOR PRISON STUD., WORLD FEMALE IMPRISONMENT LIST 1 (2012). 
 14.  MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
122 (2015); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (explaining how adherence to facially colorblind criminal laws nonetheless 
adversely affects Black people in practice, especially with regards to drug laws’ effect on women of 
color). 
 15.  GOTTSCHALK, supra note 14, at 5. 
 16.  E. ANN CARSON, PRISONERS IN 2016, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 8 (2018). 
 17.  Id. at 13. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 166 (2016). 
 20.  GOTTSCHALK, supra note 14, at 122; see also LENORA LAPIDUS ET. AL., ACLU, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE & BREAK THE CHAINS, CAUGHT IN THE NET: THE IMPACT OF DRUG POLICIES ON WOMEN AND 
FAMILIES (2005) (arguing that the wide net cast by drug laws which expand criminal liability to reach 
relatives and bystanders has contributed to women being incarcerated at a skyrocketing rate and with 
racially disparate effects).  
 21.  GOTTSCHALK, supra note 14, at 122. 
 22.  Id. 
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the rate of growth for men incarcerated for drug-related offenses.23 Even today, 
over half of incarcerated women are locked up for property or drug offenses, not 
violent crimes.24 The War on Drugs manifested itself as a war on people who used 
drugs, enforced most violently upon poor people and people of color, many of 
them women. 
This context not only provides an understanding for why female 
incarceration is so prevalent in the United States, but also how prison practices 
such as shackling during pregnancy disproportionately affect women of color and 
their children by virtue of their disproportionate levels of incarceration.25 In a 
prison system rife where the rates of incarcerated women, particularly young 
women, continue to grow, there are a substantial number of births taking place 
within penal facilities today. While statistical evidence is difficult to come by 
(given the uncertainty of pregnancy status at the onset of incarceration), present 
figures estimate between 5-10% of incarcerated women enter correctional facilities 
pregnant.26 Given current statistics of women in state and federal prisons, this 
would result in approximately 5,000-10,000 children born in confinement every 
year.27 However, this may be a significant underestimate given the staggering 
amount of women (96,000) confined in local jails, 60% of whom have not been 
convicted of a crime and are merely awaiting trial.28 
Traditionally, incarceration has been viewed as a predominantly male 
problem, despite the fact that separate women’s prisons and convict labor camps 
have existed since Reconstruction. In the late nineteenth century, separate prisons 
exclusively for women began to be established in the Northeast, focusing on the 
reformatory model that would stress domestic training for the women 
incarcerated.29 This was a major reform in womens’ incarceration. However, 
southern Black women in convict labor camps simultaneously advocated for 
separation from their male counterparts, not out of a desire for reformatory 
treatment but as a resistance to Jim Crow modernity and mode of sabotage 
towards the carceral state.30 Despite separation, as the civil rights and feminist 
movements pushed for equality during the second half of the twentieth century, 
the fight for equality included a push for gender-neutral policies in the criminal 
legal system as well. The shackling of pregnant prisoners was an unexpected 
 
 23.  LAPIDUS ET. AL., supra note 20, at 1. 
 24.  CARSON, supra note 16, at 14. 
 25.  Along with severe disparity between white and Black women, women of Hispanic origin are 
incarcerated at 1.2 times the rate of white women. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: 
INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS (2015). 
 26.  Ronald L. Braithwaite, Henrie M. Treadwell & Kimberly R.J. Arriola, Health Disparities and 
Incarcerated Women: A Population Ignored, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1679, 1680 (2005). 
 27.  CARSON, supra note 16, at 4 
 28.  ALEKS KAJSTURA, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, WOMEN’S MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 
2017 (2017). 
 29.  Nicole Hahn Rafter, Prisons for Women, 1790-1980, 5 CRIME & JUSTICE 129, 146-47 (1983). 
 30.  See SARAH HALEY, NO MERCY HERE: GENDER, PUNISHMENT, AND THE MAKING OF JIM CROW 
MODERNITY 253 (2016) (noting that the inescapable violence of convict labor evidences gendered racial 
terror that made separation an act of resistance rather than a “critique of forced proximity to 
masculinity.”). 
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byproduct of this move.31 In prisons where men are regularly shackled during 
transport outside of penal facilities, equal treatment meant shackling women as 
well, including pregnant women. But even though the adoption of gender-neutral 
regulations may be justified on equality grounds, some practices “can impose 
gender-specific indignities on female prisoners.”32 This is particularly true for the 
gender-specific issue of pregnancy, affecting a vulnerable subset of women in 
prisons and jails. The steadfast adoption of shackling in practice has become 
“emblematic of the failure of the prison system to adapt its policies of general 
application to the unique situations faced by members of the female prison 
population.”33 
Shackling of pregnant women also displays a rigid adherence to maintaining 
correctional policies outside of penal facilities, where “prison rules are 
unthinkingly exported to a hospital setting.”34 The practice, therefore, 
demonstrates not just the brazen commitment to punitiveness in incarceration but 
also the unintended consequences of a push for equal treatment under law in the 
United States, including its prisons and jails. 
B. Approaches to Shackling as Punishment for Women in a Historical Context 
The evolution of punishment in the United States is defined by changes in 
form, not function. As for its underlying principles, correctional control has 
remained largely punitive through the centuries. This has remained constant 
despite punishment being administered through disparate methods. While there 
have been momentary shifts in the direction of a more rehabilitative approach 
towards incarcerated persons, such periods are aberrations from the custom of 
retributive punishment.35 
The United States has a long history of reproductive control of women’s 
bodies, particularly Black bodies. Just as the rise of the chain gang was treated as 
a progressive and enlightened improvement upon the convict leasing system, the 
shackling of pregnant prisoners, though a brutal deprivation of autonomy, is often 
rationalized as a more enlightened version of other forms of direct female 
reproductive intervention (e.g. eugenics, forced sterilization, Norplant abuse in 
 
 31.  Colleen Mastony, Childbirth in Chains, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 18, 2010), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-18/news/ct-met-shackled-mothers-20100718_1_shackles-
handcuffs-labor; see also Claire Louise Griggs, Birthing Barbarism: The Unconstitutionality of Shackling 
Pregnant Prisoners, AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 250 (2011) (observing that the justifications 
for shackling—decreasing flight risks and maintaining security—fit under a gender-neutral 
framework). 
 32.  Deborah Ahrens, Incarcerated Childbirth and Broader “Birth Control”: Autonomy, Regulation, and 
the State, 80 MO. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015). 
 33.  Dana Sussman, Bound by Injustice: Challenging the Use of Shackles on Incarcerated Pregnant 
Women, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 477, 478 (2009). 
 34.  Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 2, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/us/prisons-often-shackle-pregnant-inmates-in-labor.html.  
 35.  ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 166 (2016); see also NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW 
LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 3 (2014) (“[T]he rise of mass incarceration [became] the triumph of 
retribution over rehabilitation.”). 
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prisons, etc.).36 Shackling takes the form of indirect reproductive intervention, one 
in which officials allow childbirth to occur but under circumstances which prevent 
enjoyment of the full, uninhibited right, free from State intrusion. Such an 
intervention is meant simply to punish pregnancy itself, painting childbirth as an 
act to be tolerated but not supported. Shackling during pregnancy, after all, “could 
have no deterrent effect on the original crime, and thereby punishes the prisoner 
for bearing children, not for breaking the law.”37 
Analyzing shackling through a Black feminist framework, Priscilla Ocen 
argues that “Black women’s subjugation during slavery and punishment regimes 
in the post-Civil War era shaped stereotypes of Black women, views of female 
prisoners, and modern prison policy.”38 These included being viewed by the state, 
distinct from white women, as “abject, malingering, criminal beings immune to 
pain and incapable of sexual consent or restraint.”39 Those stereotypes are clouds 
hanging over a sociological profile of Black female prisoners as sexually dangerous 
and incapable of responsible motherhood. Because Black women filled prisons 
during the rise of mass incarceration, these stereotypes began to infuse how the 
female prison population at large was viewed, regardless of race. The treatment of 
incarcerated women of color by the State began to be outsourced to the female 
prison population as a whole, erasing barriers in treatment to the detriment of 
white women in prison. This is an example of “leveling up” in response to racial 
disparities in punishment—rather than lessening punishment for Black prisoners 
or other minority groups to even the disparity, penal policymakers “raise the ante 
for whites by subjecting them to tougher prison [conditions].”40 
Some scholars have even pointed to pregnancy itself as being criminalized 
for Black mothers. Dorothy Roberts points to the introduction of laws punishing 
drug use during the prenatal period and subsequent prosecutions in the 1980s as 
establishing a trend whereby pregnant mothers’ harsher punishments could be 
explained by pregnancy itself.41 There is a paternalistic belief that prosecuting 
pregnant mothers, rather than attempting to mollify rampant poverty, is a racially 
 
 36.  See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 14, at 27 (noting that despite decades of political agitation that 
led to the end of convict leasing, the chain gangs that replaced them is one of many “bursts of 
optimism” in the evolution of criminal justice “that ended up yielding a sharp right turn in penal 
policy.”); this is not to allege that these other forms of reproductive control are not still practiced, just 
to lesser degrees and more subject to reprimand than shackling. See Derek Hawkins, Tenn. Judge 
Reprimanded for Offering Reduced Jail Time in Exchange for Sterilization, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/11/21/tenn-judge-reprimanded-for-
offering-reduced-jail-time-in-exchange-for-sterilization/?utm_term=.a720256052df (reporting on a 
reprimand for a Tennessee judge’s offer to reduce prison sentences by thirty days to women who 
received birth control implants). 
 37.  Claire Louise Griggs, Birthing Barbarism: The Unconstitutionality of Shackling Pregnant Prisoners, 
Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 247, 257 (2011). 
 38.  Priscilla A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the Shackling of Pregnant 
Prisoners, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (2012). 
 39.  Haley, supra note 30, at 120. 
 40.  GOTTSCHALK at 124. 
 41.  KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 180 (2nd ed. 
2017). 
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neutral way of “protecting” Black infants and ensuring healthy development.42 As 
explained earlier, white mothers are no longer immune from such a political 
calculation given the ways that incarceration has become a scarlet letter for all 
incarcerated women. 
It is important to emphasize how these types of changes in the penal system 
occur not only to understand how control over vulnerable persons morphs over 
time but also to note that even if shackling is eradicated, other punitive (though 
likely more “enlightened” policies) may take its place. Understanding the 
sociological underpinnings of the practice helps us to reframe the issue as one 
steeped in a larger liberation struggle for intersectional identities.43 
C. The Health Costs of Shackling Pregnant Women 
Though the historical subjugation of incarcerated mothers provides context, 
the medical effects appeal to how shackling during pregnancy manifests into 
cognizable injury. The practice of shackling women who are pregnant, during 
labor, delivery, or in postpartum recovery, presents a multitude of health dangers, 
not just for the mother, but for the child as well. 
i. Shackling during pregnancy 
Medical professionals have described in detail the physical risks of safety to 
mothers during the third trimester of pregnancy up until labor. During later 
stages, leg shackles prevent women from being able to shift positions to manage 
extreme pain associated with pregnancy.44 Shackles also restrict an individual’s 
mobility, which is often necessary to manage pain and ensures successful cervical 
dilation.45 For the unborn child, shackling the mother presents an unnecessary 
physical risk to his or her safety. Shackling pregnant women by the ankles during 
transport creates problems with balance that increases the chance of falling and of 
not being able to break the fall, thus leading to potential injury to the fetus.46 
ii. Shackling during labor/delivery 
Shackles impede a woman’s ability to move to alleviate the pain from 
contractions, which can decrease the flow of oxygen to the fetus.47 In addition, 
 
 42.  Id. at 184-85. 
 43.  See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking 
Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1418, 1426–27 (2012) (countering 
narratives that are singularly focused in either race or gender analysis of mass incarceration, which fail 
to explain why women of color are disproportionately affected). 
 44.  ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT AND ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT, ACLU 
BRIEFING PAPER: THE SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN & GIRLS IN U.S. PRISONS, JAILS & YOUTH 
DETENTION CENTERS, online at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/anti-shackling_briefing_paper_stand 
_alone.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2017) [hereinafter ACLU Briefing Paper]. 
 45.  Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Health Care for Pregnant and Postpartum 
Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females at 3, online at https://www.acog.org/~/media 
/Committee%20Opinions/Committee%20on%20Health%20Care%20for%20Underserved%20Women/
co511.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130725T1738421657 (2011). 
 46.  See ACLU Briefing Paper, supra note 44, at 3. 
 47.  Kendra Weatherhead, Cruel But Not Unusual Punishment: The Failure to Provide Adequate 
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shackles lead to severe bruises and cuts on ankles and wrists because of the strains 
associated with childbirth.48 Leg shackles also inhibit the mother from being able 
to manipulate her legs into the proper position for necessary treatment during 
delivery procedures.49 
Both the mother and baby’s health are compromised if there are any 
complications during delivery, such as hemorrhaging or abnormalities in fetal 
heart rate.50 Shackling makes the diagnosis and treatment of complications such as 
hypertensive disease, which is responsible for more than one out of six maternal 
deaths, extremely difficult.51 If the medical team deems sudden emergency 
procedures necessary, shackles interfere with complete access to the mother by 
doctors.52 For an emergency caesarian delivery, the mother would need to be 
moved immediately. A slight delay of even five minutes could permanently 
damage the baby’s brain.53 
iii. Post-partum shackling 
Continued shackling postpartum prevents mothers from effectively 
healing.54 Leg shackles also inhibit the postpartum recovery period, as doctors 
recommend that women walk to rehabilitate muscles after delivery during the 
postpartum period (also known as puerperium, the time after childbirth before the 
uterus has returned to its normal size).55 Effective care of a newborn can also be 
inhibited by the presence of shackles because women may have difficulty 
breastfeeding or otherwise attending to a newborn who requires immediate 
attention.56 
 
 
Medical Treatment to Female Prisoners in the United States, 13 Health Matrix 429, 430 (2003). 
 48.  See ACLU Briefing Paper, supra note 44, at 3. 
 49.  See, e.g., Dana L. Sichel, Giving Birth in Shackles: A Constitutional and Human Rights Violation, 16 
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 223, 225 (2008) (describing the plight of Maria Jones, whose legs were 
shackled during delivery, restricting her from spreading her legs apart or from getting her feet into the 
stirrups). 
 50.  Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 45, at 3. 
 51.  INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC OF UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, THE SHACKLING OF 
INCARCERATED PREGNANT WOMEN: A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION COMMITTED REGULARLY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 5 (Brian Citro et. al. eds., 2013), online at https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu 
/sites/ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Report%20-
%20Shackling%20of%20Pregnant%20Prisoners%20in%20the%20US.pdf. 
 52.  Id. at 4–5. 
 53.  AMNESTY INT’L USA, WOMEN IN CUSTODY 30, online at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/custodyissues.pdf [hereinafter Women in Custody]. 
 54.  Id.; see also Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Foster Care as Punishment: The New 
Reality of ‘Jane Crow’, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/nyregion/foster-
care-nyc-jane-crow.html?_r=0 (describing the plight of a Brooklyn woman who delivered prematurely 
and was discharged in a great deal of post-partum pain, only to be shackled in a detention cell to await 
her public defender, severely limiting her ambulatory abilities). 
 55.  ACLU Briefing Paper, supra note 44, at 3. 
 56.  See, e.g., Brawley v. Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1214 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (describing 
plaintiff’s inability to reach her newborn son when he was choking and vomiting in her room, despite 
pulling against the chains that were keeping her shackled to the bed). 
Macro file (Do Not Delete) 5/8/2018  9:04 PM 
 PREGNANCY IN CONFINEMENT 279 
Aside from physical harm posed to the mother and child, medical 
professionals have identified mental and psychological risks to mothers from the 
use of shackles during labor, delivery, and post-partum recovery. After 
experiencing childbirth in shackles, mothers may take on a significant amount of 
psychological and emotional trauma, including contributions to post-traumatic 
stress disorder and postpartum depression.57  That trauma is further exacerbated 
in the carceral system where “women frequently have serious histories of sexual 
and physical abuse that have already traumatized them.”58 
Based on the health risks of current shackling practices, the American 
Medical Association’s (“AMA”) Advocacy Resource Center has drafted legislation 
for states to adopt on shackling.59 However, though the AMA’s reform advocacy 
places great emphasis on the health costs to mothers and their children, their draft 
legislation includes some of the same issues that plague many current anti-
shackling laws, as explored below. 
II. CURRENT LAWS AND CORRECTIONAL POLICIES REGARDING SHACKLING OF 
PREGNANT INMATES 
Currently, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have laws 
restricting the shackling of pregnant women in prisons and jails in some way.60 
That leaves almost thirty states without any laws regarding shackling of pregnant 
women on the books. That list includes Wisconsin, where Melissa Hall was 
chained during delivery of her son.61 States without anti-shackling legislation 
address limitations on the practice either by milquetoast departmental policy or 
not at all. 
State anti-shackling laws that do exist are often portrayed as legislation 
“banning” or “prohibiting” shackling of pregnant prisoners.62 To understand the 
laws is to understand that without them, no binding legal mechanism to curb 
 
 57.  AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, END THE USE OF RESTRAINTS ON INCARCERATED WOMEN AND 
ADOLESCENTS DURING PREGNANCY, LABOR, CHILDBIRTH, AND RECOVERY 2 (2017), online at 
https://www.apa.org/advocacy/criminal-justice/shackling-incarcerated-women.pdf.  
 58.  Elizabeth Alexander, Unshackling Shawanna: The Battle Over Chaining Women Prisoners During 
Labor and Delivery, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 435, 436 (2010). 
 59.  AMA, AN “ACT TO PROHIBIT THE SHACKLING OF PREGNANT PRISONERS” MODEL STATE 
LEGISLATION (2015), online at https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/specialty 
%20group/arc/shackling-pregnant-prisoners-issue-brief.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 60.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-601 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3407 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 17-1-113.7 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6603 (2012); D.C. CODE § 24-276.02 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 
944.241 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 353-122 (2011); IDAHO CODE § 20-901 (2011); 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-
15003.6 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:744.3 (2012); ME. STAT. tit. 34-A, § 3102 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., 
CORR. SERVS. § 9-601 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 118 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 241.88 (2015); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-4.2 (2009); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2016); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
5905 (2010); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56.3-3 (2011); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.066 (West 2009); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 801a (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 72.09.651 (2010); W. VA. CODE § 31-20-30a (2010). 
 61.  See supra notes 3–11. 
 62.  See e.g., Melissa Jeltsen, New York Bans ‘Barbaric’ Practice of Shackling Pregnant Inmates, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/shackling-pregnant-
inmates-new-york_us_567ab103e4b0b958f658c559 (lauding the most recent update to New York’s anti-
shackling law as “the most progressive in the nation”).  
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shackling of inmates would exist. Without them, pregnant prisoners would only 
be able to rely on administrative policy decisions by state correctional departments 
or non-binding stare decisis in state common law where shackling cases have been 
decided (which is not the situation in many states). The existence of anti-shackling 
laws, therefore, is important. The laws place limitations on an otherwise 
unfettered practice, either temporally (e.g. prohibitions during labor and delivery, 
during transport, during the second or third trimester of pregnancy, etc.) or 
methodologically (e.g. prohibitions of leg shackles, waist restraints, and/or both 
wrists being handcuffed, etc.).63 
However, none of the current laws ban the use of shackles outright.64 Rather, 
at their most restrictive, the anti-shackling laws’ prohibitions on official utilization 
of shackles are beholden to a determination of whether “extraordinary 
circumstances” exist to allow their use. These “extraordinary circumstances” differ 
throughout state legislation, but there are a few commonalities in how they are 
defined. The end result is the creation of a massive loophole to effective 
enforcement of the laws. 
A. The Legislative Justifications for Shackling (and its Limitations) 
For those who recognize the inherent rights of incarcerated persons, it may 
be difficult to understand exactly how the practice of shackling could be justified 
as necessary rather than it being a mere control mechanism. However, correctional 
associations have broadly determined that shackles are justified for three reasons. 
First, shackles prevent the prisoner from harming themselves or a member of the 
medical staff.65 Second, they help prevent escape, particularly if the prisoner is a 
flight risk.66 And third, shackles are useful as a punitive instrument to remind the 
prisoner of their punishment.67 These are the justifications given for shackling 
generally across all incarcerated populations. However, they neglect to consider 
the special circumstances of pregnant women. 
When applied to pregnant women, the justifications reveal their tensile 
weakness. The risk of harm to another individual from a pregnant prisoner is 
vastly minimized by her condition, primarily due to lack of mobility. Further, 
officials rarely differentiate between women considered flight risks and those with 
no history of escape attempts or between violent and non-violent women when 
making shackling determinations.68 Even when prison officials differentiate 
between women, such a classification can sometimes be based solely upon 
irrational factors such as immigration status. This points to the intersectional 
nature of such claims, by which undocumented women can experience greater risk 
of harm due to their overlapping identities in multiple disadvantaged identities. 
 
 
 
 63.  See supra note 60. 
 64.  See id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Women in Custody, supra note 53, at 30. 
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For instance, Juana Villegas was nine months pregnant at the time of her 
arrest.69 The only reason she was detained was for not having a valid driver’s 
license.70 Despite her pregnancy, she was assigned a medium-security designation 
because of her Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer, justifying 
to authorities the use of shackles despite no indications that she would attempt to 
escape.71 Because many undocumented women are subjected to increased scrutiny 
of law enforcement and deportation at any time, some believe that “pregnancy has 
become a red flag for removal by immigration officials so that such women do not 
give birth while in [United States] custody.”72 
Regarding flight risk, the presence of a correctional officer, often armed, 
outside of the hospital room is more than sufficient to address any concerns 
regarding escape. As one federal judge noted, “[i]n order to flee or pose a threat, 
[the prisoner] would have had to harm or elude armed officer(s) and the nurse 
authorizing entry and exit from the maternity ward charged with unlocking the 
doors.”73 This illustrates the absurdity that a woman experiencing labor or regular 
contractions can pose a substantial escape risk if not shackled to her hospital bed. 
With the first two justifications offered being applied far too broadly (and 
often without justification) to incarcerated pregnant women, that leaves the last 
rationale—the punitive value of shackling as punishment. This justification, 
however, is inadequate. As explained previously, punitiveness has largely defined 
corrections in recent years, but punitiveness for punitiveness’ sake does not 
override the corresponding health risks to pregnant women of shackling.74 Merely 
using a punishment rationale treats women “not as expectant mothers in need of 
comprehensive medical care, but as criminals . . . [who have] forfeited the right to 
experience childbirth in a respectful, humane, and decent manner.”75 This is 
symptomatic of the shift in recent decades away from separation between the 
criminal act and the person who committed the crime to one in which “the crime 
is the essence of the criminal.”76 An inability to separate an expectant mother’s 
humanity from her incarcerated status leads to overreliance on the punitive value 
of shackling as justification. 
In a majority of jurisdictions, shackling pregnant inmates is a determination 
reserved for prisons themselves. Laws governing shackling only constrain the 
otherwise default approval of the practice. However, without a rational 
justification for shackling this specific population, default approval of the practice  
 
 69.  Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Dana Sussman, Bound by Injustice: Challenging the Use of Shackles on Incarcerated Pregnant 
Women, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 477, 478 (2009) (quotations omitted) (citing Priscilla Huang, Anchor 
Babies, Over-Breeders, and the Population Bomb: The Reemergence of Nativism and Population Control in Anti-
Immigration Policies, 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 385, 401 (2008)). 
 73.  Villegas, 709 F.3d at 582 (White, J. dissenting). 
 74.  See supra Part I(b). 
 75.  Sussman at 482. 
 76.  ANNE-MARIE CUSAC, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE CULTURE OF PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 14 
(2009). 
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lacks a logical foundation. None of the three standard justifications provide that 
logical foundation. 
B. The “Extraordinary Circumstances” Loophole 
While the primary language of state anti-shackling laws is aimed at explicitly 
limiting shackling during a range of times or by a range of methods, all of the 
statutes include overriding exceptions. These exceptions would allow correctional 
officers to shackle pregnant individuals during any stage of the hospital visit, from 
transport to recovery, including delivery. 
There are a few similarities that are apparent across the pieces of legislation. 
One aspect of almost every law is a mechanism for shackling based on an 
individualized determination by a correctional officer or some other official.77 This 
language introduces unilateral subjectivity to what should be an objective 
standard. Some laws require that this determination be made only when there are 
“compelling grounds” based on an “extraordinary medical or security 
circumstance” such as a substantial flight risk or an immediate threat to 
themselves or others. However, the only legal constraints on such individualized 
discretion are that the “least restrictive means necessary” be used and that, in some 
states, written explanations for the use of shackles be filed within a reasonable 
time, usually ten to fourteen days.78 These are hardly effective constraints on 
discretion that can easily be abused. While the laws themselves purport to make 
treatment better for women during pregnancy, the exception swallows the rule. 
The “extraordinary circumstances” loophole is made possible by the broad, 
discretionary nature of provisions that sanction the shackling of pregnant 
prisoners. With anti-shackling laws that expressly allow shackling under certain 
circumstances, correctional officers can continue to adhere to, if they deem it 
appropriate, the almost fetishized commitment to punitiveness as punishment in 
U.S. prisons. The shackling of pregnant prisoners displays the worst aspects of that 
punitiveness, where susceptibility to maintaining stringent gender neutrality in  
 
 77.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-601 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-1-113.7 (2011); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 6603 (2012); D.C. CODE § 24-276.02 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 944.241 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
353-122 (2011); IDAHO CODE § 20-901 (2011); 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-15003.6 (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 34-A, 
§ 3102 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 9-601 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 118 (2014); 
MINN. STAT. § 241.88 (2015); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2016); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5905 
(2010); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.066 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 72.09.651 (2010). 
 78.  The “least restrictive means necessary” constraint has a clear parallel in the strict scrutiny 
requirement that a law or policy that curtails a compelling government interest in a fundamental 
constitutional right must be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest. See Thomas v. Review 
Bd. Of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). While no caselaw explicitly governs the purview 
of “least restrictive means necessary” in restraining women during pregnancy, cases brought by 
prisoners under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) make clear that 
“courts must defer to the expert judgment of the prison officials unless the prisoner proves by 
‘substantial evidence . . . that the officials have exaggerated their response’ to security considerations.” 
See Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Espinoza v. Wilson, 814 F.2d 
1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1987)) (determining that individualized exemptions to a prison regulation 
regulating hair length and banning Native Ameircan “kouplocks” was not sufficient to “promot[e] 
prison safety and security” and that a blanket ban was the “least restrictive means necessary”). 
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prisoner treatment underlies the discretionary loophole that can make anti-
shackling laws ineffective. 
Legislators tend to leave the “extraordinary circumstances” language in as a 
failsafe, in cases where a prisoner may pose a physical threat to themselves or 
others or they pose a particularly strong flight risk. But shackling has affected a 
great number of women who meet none of these qualifications. Each one of those 
risks, despite being an “extraordinary circumstance” under normal circumstances, 
is fully mitigated by the presence of armed guards outside of the hospital room 
and the simple condition of the prisoner—pregnancy. Individuals in labor are in 
no position to flee, nor are violent criminals prone to violence when they are about 
to give birth. Instead, and as has been documented,79 there is a much higher danger 
of the language being used to justify shackling under the guise of an 
“extraordinary circumstance” where none actually exists. 
C. Enforcement of Current Anti-Shackling Laws 
Impact litigation meant to affirm an individual’s constitutional rights tend to 
offer the most promising means of remedy when correctional officers fail to adhere 
to the pronunciations of state law or when they utilize glaring loopholes in current 
anti-shackling laws. Class-action lawsuits have proceeded in recent years in 
Arizona and Illinois on behalf of inmates who were shackled even after those 
states enacted anti-shackling legislation.80 Part III will explore how those 
constitutional claims shape the jurisprudence around the Eight Amendment and 
shackling of pregnant women who are incarcerated. But for now, it is important 
to note that litigation efforts and class-action suits, like Melissa Hall’s, are an 
essential part of forcing compliance and receiving justice ex post for individuals 
who have had to endure the trauma of giving birth in chains. 
Danyell Williams, a former doula for prisoners in Philadelphia, has seen the 
effect of impact litigation efforts on noncompliance with state laws for pregnant 
prisoners. She says that such lawsuits are crucial to ensuring proper compliance 
with anti-shackling laws. “These laws were passed . . . and everybody patted 
themselves on the back for doing what was right and human and then went on 
about their business. But there’s no policing entity that’s really going to hold these 
institutions responsible.”81 When enforcement is not the default, litigation 
provides one of the only pathways to remedy. 
The stratagem of class action lawsuits against prisons and jails is to make the 
shackling of pregnant women too cost-prohibitive to continue. If prisons are 
forced to dole out damages or settlement payouts, the logic goes, they will institute 
safeguards to avoid the financial burden. After all, even in states where laws 
restrict shackling of incarcerated women during labor, delivery, or postpartum 
 
 79.  See Nina Liss-Schultz, 6 Years Ago, New York Banned the Shackling of Pregnant Inmates. So Why 
Are These Women Still Being Restrained?, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com 
/politics/2015/10/new-york-shackling-pregnant-inmates/# (describing the continued shackling of 
pregnant women due to lack of education of correctional officers and lack of oversight).  
 80.  Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239(9th Cir. 2016); Zaborowski v. Dart, 2011 WL 
6660999 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2011). 
 81.  Audrey Quinn, In Labor, in Chains: The Outrageous Shackling of Pregnant Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 27, 2014, at SR5. 
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recovery, the practice is quite prevalent. Prior to the current New York legislation 
passed in 2016, there was an anti-shackling bill passed in 2009.82 However, a report 
by the Correctional Association of New York found stark noncompliance from the 
Department of Corrections, including almost half of the women interviewed being 
shackled on the way to the hospital and over half shackled during recovery, in 
contravention of the law.83 In Illinois, the state with the earliest of the anti-
shackling laws, a class-action lawsuit was filed just a few years after, citing 
widespread noncompliance by correctional officers.84 That ended in a $4.1 million 
settlement for over 80 women who had been subjected to the cruelty of shackling 
during pregnancy or delivery.85 
Legislation, particularly that which tends to legitimize a progressive shift 
towards recognizing human rights, is only as good as its enforcement. For rights 
to be cognizable, there must be general acceptance upon the population for whom 
adherence is mandatory. As the Rebecca Project for Human Rights noted, “Laws 
and policies that are intended to meet the needs of incarcerated women and 
mothers are only meaningful if those who are responsible for effectuating them 
are properly educated and trained, and if serious repercussions are in place if they 
fail to follow the laws and policies.”86 Without specialized training, diligent 
enforcement, or a steadfast commitment to judicial oversight, the purposive vision 
of current anti-shackling laws goes unrealized. 
Enforcement is more difficult in states without anti-shackling laws, and 
where policies, if they exist, differ from facility to facility within local 
municipalities.87  Thus, a uniform implementation of durable policy regarding 
shackling of pregnant prisoners is next to impossible. Laws, not just facility 
policies, are the most efficient and durable gateway for ensuring the protection of 
rights. 
For instance, in Milwaukee, where Melissa Hall was shackled to her hospital 
bed while giving birth, no Wisconsin law nor state policy prohibited the use of 
shackling on pregnant prisoners in any way.88 Since Ms. Hall filed her complaint, 
the Milwaukee County Board has proposed a policy regarding shackling, taking 
up the same “extraordinary circumstances” language in which use of restraints 
would be opposed “unless there are extraordinary situations requiring restraints 
for the legitimate safety and security needs of the person, correctional staff or 
 
 82.  N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2015). 
 83.  TAMAR KRAFT-STOLAR, CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., REPRODUCTIVE INJUSTICE: THE STATE OF 
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN IN NEW YORK STATE PRISONS 137–38 (2015); see also Rahel 
Gebreyes, Formerly Incarcerated Woman Remembers Giving Birth While Shackled to a Bed, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/11/incarcerated-woman-birth-
shackled_n_6846112.html (recounting Mario Caraballo’s experience of giving birth while chained to 
her hospital bed in Bedford Hills, NY years after the 2009 law was in effect). 
 84.  Zaborowski, 2011 WL 6660999 at *2–3. 
 85.  Colleen Mastony, $4.1 Million Settlement For Pregnant Inmates Who Say They Were Shackled, CHI. 
TRIB. (May 23, 2012), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-lawsuit-by-pregnant-
jail-inmates-who-say-they-were-shackled-settled-for-41-million-20120522-story.html.  
 86.  REBECCA PROJECT FOR HUM. RTS., MOTHERS BEHIND BARS 10 (2010). 
 87.  Deborah Ahrens, Incarcerated Childbirth and Broader “Birth Control”: Autonomy, Regulation, and 
the State, 80 MO. L. REV. 1, 21 (2015). 
 88.  See supra note 3; see also infra note 89. 
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public.”89 However, the County Board has no authority to impose policies at the 
jail, since the jail is administered by the Sheriff’s Office.90 This makes the policy 
symbolic rather than enforceable. 
Creating an environment where pregnant women who are shackled feel 
emboldened to report and seek redress is one way to ensure that current laws are 
enforced. Often, incarcerated women risk backlash from correctional officers for 
making grievances to the Department of Corrections (the necessary first step to 
litigation under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996).91 Further, “[i]t is 
important to note that the scarcity of reported cases of such abuse may reflect the 
mindset of the women who are being shackled while giving birth rather than the 
incidence of such cases. Women in custody are routinely shackled and often do 
not make complaints about practices that they see as inherent factors of 
incarceration.”92 Conditions of confinement, to many, are what comes with the 
territory of being incarcerated. However, inhumane conditions or practices are 
challengeable, particularly something as grievous as shackling during pregnancy 
or childbirth. Litigation is a necessary step towards eradicating the shackling of 
pregnant women by making engagement in the practice too steep of a financial 
burden. 
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR LIMITING THE PRACTICE 
Incarcerated women who are shackled during labor, delivery, or post-partum 
recovery have an established framework available to them by which to assert a 
violation of their constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment.93 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”94 This includes the conditions within prisons, not just the particular 
sentence.95 Incarcerated women are sentenced to time in the prison or jail and, as 
such, the commensurate conditions are part of that time served.96 As the Supreme 
Court wrote in Farmer v. Brennan, “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable 
prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the  
  
 
 89.  Don Behm, Milwaukee County Board considers limits on use of restraints on pregnant inmates, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee 
/2017/09/14/milwaukee-county-board-considers-limits-use-restraints-pregnant-inmates/664248001/. 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996) (explaining the exhaustion requirement that mandates 
prisoners go through administrative channels in their correctional facilities in an attempt to remedy 
their claim before filing suit in federal court). 
 92.  Women in Custody, supra note 53, at 33. 
 93.  The Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment was incorporated 
against the states, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 94.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 95.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (holding that the denial of medical care within 
prisons violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 96.  See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (establishing that conditions that “deprive 
inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” could be considered cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
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treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the condition under which he is 
confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”97 
The Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, 
civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . against which we must evaluate 
penal measures.”98 In juxtaposition to these concepts of humanity are 
“unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain,” which constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.99 In making this determination 
in the context of conditions of confinement, courts must “ascertain whether [an 
official] acted with deliberate indifference to the inmates’ health or safety.”100 
A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” towards prisoners if one 
“knows of and disregards a serious medical need or a substantial risk to an 
inmate’s health or safety.”101 Eighth Amendment claims require both an objective 
and subjective component.102 For the objective component, one must prove that “the 
detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm.”103 It also requires that courts 
“assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so 
grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency—that is, it is not one that 
today’s society chooses to tolerate.”104 For the subjective component, a prison 
official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”105 
This subjective state of mind “may be inferred from the fact that the risk of harm 
is obvious.”106 In some cases, courts have pointed to the obviousness of the harms 
caused in relation to their virtually non-existent penological concerns to find in 
favor of petitioners. In Brawley, the court cited mere common sense as controlling 
in the case—”[c]ommon sense . . . tells us that it is not good practice to shackle 
women to a hospital bed while they are in labor.”107 In Women Prisoners v. District 
of Columbia, the district court found that “the risk of injury to women prisoners is 
obvious”108 and that during labor, “shackling is inhumane.”109 And in Villegas, the 
Court broadened the scope to proclaim that, in general, “shackling women during 
labor runs afoul of the protections of the Eighth Amendment.”110 
However, meeting the requirements of both prongs of the “deliberate 
indifference” standard remains a difficult hurdle to clear. To some scholars, Eighth 
 
 97.  511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotations omitted). 
 98.  Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quotations omitted). 
 99.  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (quotations omitted). 
 100.  Id.; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (holding that “deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”) 
 101.  Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). 
 102.  Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 103.  Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 104.  Id. (quotations omitted). 
 105.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
 106.  Brawley v. Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 
536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002)). 
 107.  Id. at 1219. 
 108.  Women Prisoners v. D.C., 877 F. Supp. 634, 669 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 109.  Id. at 668. 
 110.  Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 574 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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Amendment doctrine is too focused on an individual actor’s intent rather than the 
collective effects of the institution on those incarcerated.111 This critique highlights 
an issue that often arises under the “evolving standards of decency” metric for 
cruel and unusual punishment, that large scale institutional and societal 
constraints are overlooked, and, thus, disproportionately difficult to successfully 
litigate.112 
The individualized way that the “deliberate indifference” standard is 
determined in pregnant shackling claims disregards the reliance on power 
structures in modern day U.S. corrections. Harms suffered by incarcerated persons 
often stem from the indifference of an institution or entire system, rather than a 
particular officer.113 This is a common critique of mass incarceration as a whole. 
Zooming out to grasp how the prevalent shackling of women in labor indicts 
systemic indifference to a class of persons does not require an analysis of whether 
personal animus or disregard was present. When institutions fail to rein in abuse, 
they embody the system’s deliberate indifference towards pregnant women. This 
institutional critique of how the “deliberate indifference” standard is implemented 
demonstrates how the individualized discretion of the “extraordinary 
circumstances” loophole weakens the standard’s potential for correcting systemic 
abuses. A single official, in many cases, has the authority to determine when an 
extraordinary circumstance exists to justify shackling, based upon little or no 
corroborating evidence. Therefore, the provision becomes a loophole, providing a 
pseudo defense to the current standard by ensuring that no single individual is 
deliberately indifferent. 
Where anti-shackling laws do not exist, meeting the demands of the 
deliberate indifference standard is also difficult, because pointing to constructive 
knowledge of proper standards is met by the existence of anti-shackling 
legislation. In such cases, lack of knowledge to the risk of harm to the pregnant 
individual may be used as a defense. Though the “extraordinary circumstances” 
loophole is not present where no law exists, defendants may also invoke the 
principle that anchors the loophole—a discretionary determination that shackles 
were necessary. This may be combined with a “lack of knowledge” defense to 
justify the exercise of discretion as “necessary.” Such a situation creates potential 
litigation difficulties in cases such as Melissa Hall’s class action lawsuit against 
Milwaukee County Jail, by providing two defenses that rest on individualized 
standards—lack of individual knowledge or the invocation of individual 
discretion. 
A better “evolving standards of decency” standard would take a holistic view 
of the dichotomy between harm to the pregnant mother versus penological 
concerns. Traditional focus on “cruel and unusual” in an age of mass incarceration, 
 
 111.  See Ocen, supra note 38, at 1246 (“the doctrinal framework for ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments’ is focused on the harmful intent of individual actors rather than institutions, and views 
conditions of confinement from the perspective of the perpetrator instead of the prisoner”). 
 112.  See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
 113.  See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
881, 926 (2009) (arguing that, “by virtue of its design and operation, [institutions] systematically 
subject[] some subset of the population to needless and avoidable suffering” via their deliberate 
indifference). 
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where confinement is the default mechanism for punishment, shifts the normative 
construction of “cruel” to its punitive extreme. So long as shackling, within the 
community by which contemporary standards of decency are measured, meets the 
requirement that it is not unusual, the practice passes constitutional muster. 
A broader view of the “evolving standards of decency” could draw upon 
international standards, as explored in Part IV. Such a construction would present 
a more prisoner-centered way of assessing the validity of constitutional claims 
regarding violation of pregnant individuals’ rights vis-à-vis shackling. A broader 
scope for the standard would be instrumental in correcting the gradual shift 
toward individuals over the collective in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
While courts have developed standards within the past few decades for 
determining the constitutionality of shackling pregnant women, there is room for 
growth away from stringent individual subjectivity and towards a standard that 
more clearly updates the evolving standards of what is cruel and unusual in U.S. 
prisons. 
IV. MAPPING A NEW APPROACH 
In the absence of truly effective implementation of measures that would curb 
the shackling of pregnant women in prison, a three-prong strategy is imperative. 
A strategy that combines (1) impact litigation aimed at obtaining relief, (2) state 
legislation intended to dismantle discretionary loopholes, and (3) grassroots 
efforts built on empowering affected communities and educating those in power 
could provide meaningful steps toward the eradication of shackling pregnant 
women. 
Different approaches to litigation that reject the constraints of traditional 
Eighth Amendment precedence may derive from the Reconstruction 
Amendments or by drawing upon international human rights law and adopting 
an analogous framework. Legislative efforts would require lawmakers to close 
loopholes that grant unilateral discretion to officers in how they treat pregnant 
individuals under their control. In addition to new legislation, there are grassroots 
activist efforts that aim to use the momentum of social movements to eradicate 
shackling of pregnant prisoners and elevate public awareness of other efforts to 
curb injustice against incarcerated women. This three-pronged approach does not 
view any one of these prongs as a panacea, but rather each one as interdependent 
for achieving the abolition of shackling generally, but particularly of pregnant 
individuals. While grassroots efforts use extra-institutional methods of affecting 
change, they must coincide with institutional changes in law. Those changes in 
law can be spurred by effective impact litigation that takes novel legal approaches 
to broaden the scope of Eighth Amendment understanding on shackling. 
A. The Constraints and Opportunities of Impact Litigation 
In many ways, impact litigation may act as the spark necessary to create 
change in laws. In modern jurisprudence, there are several impediments, as well 
as opportunities for creativity, to advancing anti-shackling efforts. 
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i. The Daunting Threshold Requirement of the PLRA 
Since 1996, when Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”), incarcerated individuals have had difficulty meeting the heightened 
requirements that lawmakers imposed upon them for filing claims.114 The PLRA 
imposes filing and evidentiary requirements on prisoners and limits prospective 
relief in court.115 The primary constraint of the PLRA on prospective plaintiffs is 
that prisoners must exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a civil claim 
in federal court.116 There are only three circumstances in which an administrative 
remedy is not deemed available.117 However, these occur only on a case-by-case 
basis and are dependent on facility administrative protocols.118 The exceptions do 
not encapsulate all incarcerated pregnant women as a class. 
After Congress passed the PLRA, many states followed suit, enacting similar 
legislation for their courts.119 These state laws limit prisoners’ ability to seek 
remedies through litigation, because most prisoners in the United States are 
incarcerated in state prisons and jails. Since the passage of the PLRA, lawsuits have 
greatly decreased, including §1983 civil claims and Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Persons Act (“CRIPA”) claims.120  In addition, the requirement under the PLRA 
that incarcerated individuals exhaust all remedies before filing suit in court may 
further exacerbate the trauma by forcing women to continue reliving events that 
caused great suffering by recounting the same story during each successive 
grievance. 
A repeal of the PLRA (and its state-level offshoots) is the clearest avenue for 
allowing shackling claims by pregnant women to be heard in court. Due to the risk 
of overcrowded courts, that is likely a tenuous proposition. But permitting non-
administrative remedies allows courts to apply more pertinent legal solutions for 
the claims of shackled pregnant women in U.S. prisons and jails. 
If a lawsuit does pass the threshold requirements of the PLRA, taking an 
approach that bears in mind the Thirteenth Amendment, as explained below, can 
provide an opportunity for litigation to shape remedies for victims, even in the 
absence of adequate legislation that closes discretionary loopholes. 
ii. The Antisubordination Approach 
There are a few unexplored methodologies available for combatting 
shackling of pregnant individuals that may prove effective through impact 
litigation. 
As far as reshaping litigation regarding shackling, some scholars have 
advanced one innovative approach, dubbed the “antisubordination approach.”121 
 
 114.  Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996); see also JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL E. 
MANVILLE, PRISONERS’ SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL 546, 4th ed. (2010). 
 115.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1859 (2016). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Ivy A. Finkenstadt, Representing Prisoner Clients: Prison Litigation Reform Act, 44-DEC Md. B.J. 
58, 60 (2011). 
 120.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §1997 (1980). 
 121.  See, e.g., Ocen, supra note 38, at 1248. 
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This proposal approaches the Eighth Amendment and the shackling of pregnant 
women through a Thirteenth Amendment lens. If the values of the Thirteenth 
Amendment guide a determination of the “evolving standards of decency” under 
the Eighth Amendment, courts would consider the ways that the latter 
encapsulates the eradication of slavery and, to a larger extent, racial hierarchy, 
which is at the crux of the Thirteenth Amendment.122 
Such an approach requires viewing shackling of incarcerated pregnant 
women, a large number of whom are not Black, as a badge or incident of slavery. 
Chaining people in general, but particularly women during the late stages of 
pregnancy, is the type of scarlet letter that the Framers of the Reconstruction 
Amendments would have considered a badge of slavery. Non-Black individuals 
who are shackled during pregnancy may still be able to make the claim, provided 
they show an adequate nexus between the history of slavery practices and the 
nature of the injury suffered.123 Without showing this nexus, the Thirteenth 
Amendment becomes diluted by introducing grievances unrelated to slavery. But 
here, where chains and shackles on Black bodies were an inherent mark of slavery, 
particularly for Black mothers through slave breeding, shackling during 
pregnancy is a badge or incident of slavery. This would focus the badge or incident 
specifically on the practice of shackling, which has the starkest connection to the 
experiences of enslaved women. Some scholars have even expressed support for 
recognizing the more general “denial of Black women’s reproductive autonomy” 
as a badge of slavery.124 Thus, there could be a possible expansion of shackling 
legislation through use of Section 2 of Thirteenth Amendment.125 But even if 
Congress determines that shackling pregnant women is a badge or incident of 
slavery, such laws would only abrogate the practice if they did not include any 
discretionary loopholes. 
The Thirteenth Amendment is the most likely assistant of all the 
Reconstruction Amendments, since the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses would not help. An equal protection claim 
would not prevail absent intentional or purposeful discrimination on an 
individualized basis, since pregnancy discrimination is not outlawed by the Equal 
Protection Clause.126 Further, without solid data regarding the specific racial 
breakdown of women shackled during pregnancy, claims on the basis of race as 
harming a “discrete or insular minority”, a sufficient substantive due process 
claim would be difficult to make.127 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See William M. Carter, Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1317–18 (2007) (arguing for an interpretation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause that is evolutionary, with regard for the experiences of 
those who were victimized by human bondage.). 
 124.  DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF 
LIBERTY 304 (2d ed. 2017). 
 125.  See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968) (holding that the enforcement section 
of the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to regulate private property transactions to 
prevent racial discrimination, describing such restrictive covenants as “badges and incidents of 
slavery”). 
 126.  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974). 
 127.  This Note will not delve into whether lack of restraints during pregnancy constitute a 
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iii. Using International Law Standards to Shape the Eighth Amendment 
One novel avenue that could enlighten Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is 
adopting an international human rights framework. This has been helpful in 
litigation regarding the gay rights movement, sparked by Lawrence v. Texas, which 
overturned Texas’s anti-sodomy law that outlawed consensual homosexual 
conduct.128 In the opinion, the Court drew upon how values in foreign countries 
have shaped the values of the U.S. with regards to homosexuality, including from 
the European Court of Human Rights.129 A similar approach may be instructive 
for the court in handling shackling claims for pregnant individuals in American 
prisons and jails. The United States has ratified the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (“CAT”), one of the core treaties shaping international human rights 
law. The CAT outlaws cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment even in instances 
that do not rise to the level of torture as defined in Article 16.130 Another core 
international human rights treaty is the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which holds that “State Parties shall 
ensure women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement 
and the post-natal period.”131 Though the United States has signed CEDAW, they 
are one of only six countries that have not ratified it.132 
The U.N. Standard Minimum Rule for the Treatment of Prisoners requires 
that chains or irons never be used as restraints for any prisoner, not just for 
pregnant prisoners.133 In addition, Amnesty International has reported on 
shackling in the U.S. and finds many key indicia of violations under customary 
international law.134 A Shadow Report on Shackling of Incarcerated Pregnant 
Women was submitted for the periodic report on U.S. adherence to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which implicates the 
U.S. as having violated international obligations due to state policies on shackling 
and its widespread (and permissive) utilization.135 
 
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 128.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 129.  Id. at 576–77; see also Alison L. Smock, Childbirth in Chains: A Report on the Cruel but not so 
Unusual Practice of Shackling Incarcerated Pregnant Females in the United States, 3 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER 
& SOC. JUST. 111, 131–32 (2014). 
 130.  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, U.S., Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 131.  Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, art. 12(2), adopted Dec. 18, 
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S.13. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, U.S., Aug. 30, 1955, 
E.S.C. Res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611. 
 134.  AMNESTY INT’L USA, “NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE”—VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN IN CUSTODY 11 (1999), available at https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/usa-not-part-of-my-
sentence-violations-of-the-human-rights-of-women-in-custody/. 
 135.  INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC OF UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, THE SHACKLING OF 
INCARCERATED PREGNANT WOMEN: A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION COMMITTED REGULARLY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 5 (Brian Citro et. al. eds., 2013), online at https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/sites 
/ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Report%20-%20Shackling%20of%20Pregnant%20Prisoners 
%20in%20the%20US.pdf. 
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Using international standards and the United States’ obligations under 
international human rights law could significantly enlighten how we view the 
“evolving standards of decency” under the Eighth Amendment. Drawing upon 
the ways other civilized countries treat pregnant prisoners, and relying on the 
obligations to which the U.S. has consented, indicates an understanding that the 
United States does not exist in a bubble. Similar campaigns to adopt international 
standards are not unheard of in prisoners’ rights advocacy. In 2017, Colorado 
banned prolonged solitary confinement, citing discussions regarding the adoption 
of the new “Nelson Mandela Rules” in banning the placement of prisoners in 
segregation beyond fifteen days.136 Broadening the scope of the community 
standards that govern cruel and unusual punishment would help to categorize 
shackling of pregnant prisoners as falling well short of international human rights 
standards. 
B. Closing the “Extraordinary Circumstances” Loophole in State Laws 
As noted in Part II, while twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have 
laws governing shackling of pregnant individuals, none have an outright ban on 
the practice. All contain a broadly discretionary provision that is woefully 
inadequate for fully curbing the effects of shackling. One reason for hope, 
however, is the recent Congressional bill proposal, the Dignity for Incarcerated 
Women Act of 2017.137 Introduced in July 2017, the bill includes an express 
prohibition on shackling, completely free of potential loopholes. The bill states, “A 
Federal penal or correctional institution may not use instruments of restraint, 
including handcuffs, chains, irons, straitjackets, or similar items, on a prisoner who 
is pregnant.”138 This language includes nothing about “extraordinary 
circumstances” or “individualized determinations” regarding when shackling 
may be appropriate for pregnant persons. It also encapsulates the most permissive 
time period for protection by including even the first trimester of pregnancy. 
However, federal prisons account for less than 12% of the overall population of 
incarcerated women.139 Therefore, the scope of the proposed law is far from a 
complete solution to curbing the practice in the United States. 
State level legislation is also required, with a focus on limiting the 
“extraordinary circumstances” loophole. While a complete state ban, in the spirit 
of the proposed federal law, would curtail the loophole, it also would disregard 
actual situations of danger. A ban on shackling during pregnancy, labor, and 
delivery conditioned only upon a determination by medical personnel during 
pregnancy/labor would allow doctors or nurses to place medical needs at the 
forefront. Restraints should only be used when an unrestrained individual would 
impede adequate medical care or pose a significant risk of harm to another or 
themselves, as determined by the medical personnel who have the health interests 
of the individual as their priority. Medical personnel are almost universally 
 
 136.  Rick Raemisch, Why We Ended Long-Term Solitary Confinement in Colorado, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 
2017),https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/opinion/solitary-confinement-colorado-prison.html? 
mtrref=www.google.com&assetType=opinion.  
 137.  S. 1524, 115th Cong. § (d)(2) (2017). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  E. ANN CARSON, PRISONERS IN 2015, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 5 (2016). 
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opposed to shackling during pregnancy and they often express concern when 
shackles are used during labor or delivery.140 Therefore, only when the 
determination is theirs to make could one say that the interests in shackling during 
pregnancy outweigh the risks to the mother and child. 
Congress should pass the Dignity for Incarcerated Women Act to establish a 
standard from which states can take inspiration. States, both with and without 
laws regarding shackling of pregnant women should focus on passing legislation 
that protects incarcerated women and removes the overly discretionary 
“extraordinary circumstances” loopholes that allow for shackling to go on 
undeterred. 
C. Grassroots Organizing Efforts 
One such grassroots effort that has come under the spotlight in recent years 
is The Movement for Black Lives (“MBL”), a conglomeration of organizations 
advocating for Black liberation in the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement. 
Although started in direct response to the killings of Black people by police and 
vigilantes, MBL has used that groundswell of activism as a gateway to address 
other issues of systemic inequality. This culminated in the conglomerate releasing 
a platform of their vision in 2016, which included “the end of shackling of pregnant 
people.”141 Recognizing the ways shackling disproportionately affects Black 
women in particular (due to their higher rate of imprisonment than any other 
racial group), the Movement for Black Lives sees the eradication of shackling for 
all prisoners as a goal for racial justice. MBL has also “created a public testament 
to the myriad ways beyond the courts that the law changes, the pressures to which 
it responds and through which it is constituted.”142 In arguing that the law is not 
neutral and the state has the capacity to use it for violence, “the movement makes 
clear that the ordinary channels of accountability cannot be relied on.”143 
Some of their work has been geared toward bringing about steady 
improvement of the criminal legal system. In Washington, D.C., activists have 
pushed for “a cascading series of local initiatives” aimed at prisons and policing, 
including bans on shackling of juveniles in court.144 Such efforts, though not 
directed towards pregnant women, can lead to shifting energy toward the plight 
of other identities of Black persons, such as incarcerated mothers. Additionally, 
efforts to curb colorblind practices generally that have a disparate impact on Black 
women will specifically help to uplift all women who are harmed by the practice. 
SisterSong is a collective led by women of color fighting for reproductive 
justice by analyzing the power systems and intersecting oppressions blocking 
access to meaningful exercise of reproductive rights. Focused on direct action and 
 
 140.  See AMA, supra note 59, at 1 (describing the use of shackles on pregnant women as “a barbaric 
practice that needlessly inflicts excruciating pain and humiliation.). 
 141.  Movement for Black Lives, A Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom & 
Justice, online at https://policy.m4bl.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
 142.  Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. Legal Educ. 352, 
355 (2015). 
 143.  Id. at 364. 
 144.  Jason Fernandes, The Movement for Black Lives is Changing Policing in D.C., TALK POVERTY (Aug. 
2, 2017), https://talkpoverty.org/2017/08/02/movement-Black-lives-changing-policing-d-c/. 
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educational programming on reproductive justice issues, SisterSong’s efforts to 
eradicate shackling are draped in a broader abolitionist framework. Ash Williams, 
an organizer based in North Carolina, explained their mission. “We don’t want an 
alternative to shackling. We want an alternative to prison, which makes the 
shackling possible.”145 SisterSong’s organizing pressured North Carolina’s 
Department of Public Safety to revise their administrative policies, prohibiting the 
use of restraints while a woman is in labor, during delivery, and during a mother’s 
initial bonding period after birth.146 Though the policy includes a loophole similar 
to the “extraordinary circumstances” loophole described above, the shift is 
significant in its display of the impact that grassroots organizing, rooted in a 
broader racial justice framework, can have on state shackling policies. 
CONCLUSION 
Shackling women during the late stages of pregnancy and childbirth is 
widely practiced in the United States, despite many state laws and recent litigation 
attempting to restrict it. While incarcerated women are one of the most 
marginalized groups in society, an embrace of gender-neutral policies in 
corrections has caused gender-specific harms for pregnant women. Since women 
of color traditionally have filled prisons and immigration detention facilities and 
have greater rates of carceral representation in comparison to other groups, they 
have been disproportionately subject to this mode of punitive punishment. 
However, as crime became more racialized and those who filled prisons became 
outcasts, all incarcerated women, regardless of race, were dehumanized by 
practices meant to eradicate autonomy. 
Though almost half of states have legislation meant to curtail shackling, those 
laws in fact provide officials with the unilateral discretion necessary to impose 
overly punitive punishment unto the most vulnerable communities in prisons. 
Further, the courts’ application of a “deliberate indifference” standard has worked 
for many plaintiffs but issues regarding its individual standard and threshold 
concerns from the PLRA have made litigation difficult for many prisoners. For 
them, a suitable remedy for their trauma has gone unrealized. Using international 
human rights standards in U.S. litigation regarding shackling presents an 
opportunity to shift the “evolving standards of decency,” providing a more 
sympathetic pathway for shackled women. In addition, a framework that 
incorporates the racial context, particularly through the Thirteenth Amendment, 
could morph the shape of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence around conditions of 
confinement standards. 
The United States must eradicate the blight of chains on human flesh, 
particularly the flesh of individuals bearing new human life. Combining methods 
in litigation, legislation, and social movement to combat the widespread practice 
of shackling pregnant individuals can break ground for criminal justice advocates 
 
 145.  Sarah Willets, Under Pressure, NC Prisons Revise Policy on Restraining Pregnant Detainees, INDY 
WEEK (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.indyweek.com/news/archives/2018/03/26/under-pressure-nc-
prisons-revise-policy-on-restraining-pregnant-detainees.  
 146.  Anne Blythe, NC Prisons Change Restraint Policy for Pregnant Inmates After Complaints, THE 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2018), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/crime/article 
206877024.html.  
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to reshape the way we think of “cruel and unusual punishment” and make strides 
towards ending one of the most inhumane practices in U.S. prisons. 
 
